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IMPERVIOUS TO PROPOSED STATE EFFORTS
TO LIMIT AIRPORT NOISE
MICHAEL J. PAVLICEK*
I. INTRODUCTION
THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION (FAA)
estimated in 1976 that six million United States citizens
resided on ninety-thousand acres of land exposed to airport
noise of annoying levels.' In the Chicago area alone, over one
hundred thousand households are subjected to excessive air-
port noise.2 Despite public knowledge of the magnitude of the
problem, very little has been done in past years to bring per-
ceptible relief to those who need it. The Illinois Pollution
Control Board (IPCB), which conducted initial regulatory
hearings for almost five years, has made the most ambitious
attempt of any governmental body to discover what, if any-
thing, can be done to reduce the present impact of airport
noise upon the citizens of Illinois.' Although the airport noise
proposal has been the subject of more hearings than any other
regulatory proceeding the IPCB has ever conducted, the
IPCB's final decision may offer little or no aid to people ad-
* J.D., 1981, B.A., 1978, De Paul University. Mr. Pavlicek is an associate with the
Chicago law firm of Schaffenegger, Watson and Peterson, Ltd. He is a former Admin-
istrative Assistant and Hearing Officer to the Illinois Pollution Control Board.
I U.S. DEPT. OF TRANSPORTATION, AVIATION NOISE ABATEMENT POLICY 17 (1976)
[hereinafter cited as AVIATION NOISE ABATEMENT POLICY].
2 ILL. INST. OF NATURAL RESOURCES, Doc. No. 81/39, ECONOMIC IMPACT STUDY OF
PROPOSED AIRPORT NOISE REGULATIONS, R77-4 VOL. IV. ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF
O'HARE AND MIDWAY AIRPORTS, Project No. 30.017 (Nov., 1981) [hereinafter cited as
ECONOMIC IMPACT STUDY].
' Petition for Adoption of an Amendment to Chapter 8: Noise Regulations, Illi-
nois Pollution Control Board Rules and Regulations: Hearings on R77-4 Before The
Illinois Pollution Control Board (1977-1980) [hereinafter cited as Airport Noise
Hearings].
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versely affected by noise at O'Hare International Airport
(O'Hare).'
The rulemaking hearings elicited more than seven thousand
pages of testimony. The sole topic of discussion was a propo-
sal submitted by the Illinois Attorney General. Because the
IPCB may modify the attorney general's proposal without
conducting hearings,5 or fail to adopt any rule,6 the purpose of
this article is not to predict the ICPB's ultimate decision. The
purpose is merely to demonstrate the complexity of formulat-
ing a legally valid, technologically feasible, and economically
reasonable state regulation that effectively abates noise at the
world's busiest airport. An analysis of the testimony presented
at the rulemaking hearings reveals the practical impact of air-
port noise abatement options arguably within the state's scope
of authority.
Noise associated with O'Hare and other airports has not
been abated partially because of the federal government's ex-
clusive control of navigable airspace.7 Despite having the au-
thority to immediately reduce the impact of airport noise, the
FAA has acted to implement a permanent solution over a pe-
riod of several years.6 Those citizens who have cried for a res-
pite from O'Hare's incessent and nerve-shattering din have
4 Federal preemption may limit the IPCB's ability to abate airport noise. See infra
notes 23-25 and accompanying text.
Environmental Protection Act § 28, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 111-1/2, § 1028 (1977).
Id. § 1027(a).
See 49 U.S.C. § 1508(a) (1976 & Supp. 1981).
See Noise Limits for Subsonic Transport Category Large Airplanes and Subsonic
Turbojet Powered Airplanes, 14 C.F.R. § 36.201 (1981), and Operating Noise Limits,
14 C.F.R. §§ 91.301-91.308 (1981) for the present federal aircraft noise compliance
plan.
See Doc. No. 9337, 34 Fed. Reg. 18,364 (1969) as amended by Amendment 36-1, 34
Fed. Reg. 18,815 (1969); 34 Fed. Reg. 19,025 (1969); Amendment 36-5, 41 Fed. Reg.
35,058 (1976); Amendment 36-7, 42 Fed. Reg. 12,371 (1977); Amendment 36-8, 43
Fed. Reg. 8,730 (1978); Amendment 36-10, 43 Fed. Reg. 28,420 (1978); 43 Fed. Reg.
44,475 (1978); 43 Fed. Reg. 47,489 (1978), for evolution of 14 C.F.R. § 36.201 noise
limits.
See Doc. Nos. 13,582 and 14,317, Amendment 91-136, 41 Fed. Reg. 56,055 (1976),
as amended by Amendment 91-153, 43 Fed. Reg. 28,421 (1978); Amendment 91-161,
44 Fed. Reg. 75,562 (1979); Amendment 91-170, 45 Fed. Reg. 67,259 (1980); Amend-
ment 91-171, 45 Fed. Reg. 79,315 (1980), for evolution of 14 C.F.R. § 91.301 Sub-
chapter E Operating Noise Limits.
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accused the FAA of being unfairly deferential to the airline
industry, which the FAA was statutorily authorized to pro-
mote. From the perspective of the airport noise "victims,"
the FAA has moved too slowly in producing a long-term rem-
edy and has essentially ignored the prospects of limited, but
immediate, relief.10 Organizations representing the airlines,
airports, and airline pilots are satisfied with the FAA's re-
sponse and view it as a safe, uniform approach." To begin to
understand the complexity of the O'Hare noise problem, it is
essential to first examine the origin, scope, and division of re-
sponsibility in the field of airport noise.
II. FEDERAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR AIRPORT NOISE
The principal aviation responsibilites assigned to the Fed-
eral Aviation Administrator, and since 1966 to the Secretary
of Transportation, are the safety and promotion of air com-
merce. 12 The Federal Aviation Act of 1958 (the Act) has basi-
cally three purposes: (1) that commerce be regulated in a
manner which best promotes growth, safety, and national de-
fense; (2) that civil and military uses of navigable airspace be
regulated by the federal government in the interests of safety
and efficiency; and (3) that a common system of air traffic
control and navigation for military and civil aircraft be insti-
tuted.13 The Act explicitly grants "complete and exclusive na-
tional sovereignty in the airspace of the United States" to the
federal government.' 4 Furthermore, the Secretary of Trans-
portation has broad authority to regulate the use of the navi-
gable airspace "in order to insure the safety of aircraft and
the efficient utilization of such airspace . . [and] for the pro-
' Federal Aviation Act, 49 U.S.C. § 1303 (1976).
,0 Airport Noise Hearings, supra note 3, at 181-82 (statement by Park Ridge
Mayor Butler).
" See, e.g., Id. at 145 (June 17, 1977) (statement by Captain Pryde of the Air Line
Pilots Association); Id. at 3,060 (July 27, 1978) (statement by General von Kann of
the Air Transport Association).
" Federal Aviation Act, 49 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1303 (1976).
3 Id. § 1303.
1 Id. § 1508(a).
1982]
416 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE [47
tection of persons and property on the ground."1 . The grant
of exclusive jurisdiction, however, concerns only the airspace
of the United States. Consequently, the states arguably have
some jurisdiction over the ground activities at airports.
Because the abatement of airport noise does not always re-
quire the manipulation of flight operations in the airspace,
states have attempted to regulate airport noise primarily in a
manner that does not directly affect flight. 6 While this type
of state action presumably does not infringe upon the federal
government's exclusive jurisdiction, Congress did not want to
leave the task of airport noise regulation in the hands of the
states. As early as 1968 the FAA was given authority to pro-
mulgate regulations concerning the abatement of aircraft
noise and sonic boom. 17 Congress later enacted the Noise Con-
trol Act of 1972 to involve the United States Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) in the comprehensive scheme of
federal control of aircraft noise.'8 EPA was given the right to
propose aircraft noise regulation and to require the FAA to
make detailed findings, determining whether or not the pro-
posed regulation should be adopted. 9 Recently, Congress en-
acted the Aviation Safety and Noise Abatement Act of 1979,20
requiring proprietors to submit a noise compatability program
to the Secretary of Transportation 2 ' and attempting to shield
proprietors from liability for noise damages to property own-
ers with actual or constructive knowledge of a submitted noise
exposure map.22
'o Id. § 1348(a), (c).
' See CAL. Pus. UTIL. CODE § 21669-21669.6 (West Supp. 1981); MD. TRANSP.
CODE ANN. §§ 5-802 to 5-814 (1977); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 473.216, 473.602 (West
1977).
7 49 U.S.C. § 1431(b) (1976).
' 42 U.S.C. §§ 4901-4918 (1976 and Supp. III 1979).
Id. § 1431(b), (c).
20 49 U.S.C.A. § 2101-2125 (West Supp. 1981).
I d. § 2104.
22 Id. § 2107.
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III. FEDERAL PREEMPTION AND THE ROLE OF THE AIRPORT
PROPRIETOR
The scope of both the airport proprietor's and the munici-
pality's powers was addressed, but not necessarily clarified, in
City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc.2 In Bur-
bank, the United States Supreme Court, in striking down a
curfew imposed by the City of Burbank upon a privately
owned airport, stated that "the pervasive nature of the
scheme of federal regulation of aircraft noise . . . leads us to
conclude that there is pre-emption."' "2 In footnote fourteen,
however, Justice Douglas, writing for the majority, added that
"[w]e do not consider here what limits, if any, apply to a mu-
nicipality as a proprietor. 2 5 In the same footnote Douglas de-
clared that "[a]irport owners acting as proprietors can pres-
ently deny the use of their airports to aircraft on the basis of
noise considerations so long as such exclusion is nondiscrimi-
natory.' 6 Footnote fourteen, therefore, can be interpreted as
limiting the decision to the peculiar facts of the case: a munic-
ipality attempting to regulate noise at a major, but private,
airport.
With the scope of Burbank undetermined, courts applying
the case have arrived at diverse conclusions. National Avia-
tion v. City of Hayward27 upheld the power of a municipality,
which was the proprietor of an airport, to impose a curfew on
aircraft that emitted more than seventy-five decibels on take-
off or landing.26 The seventy-five decibel limitation, deter-
mined by experts to be the maximum permissible noise level
that would not disturb sleep, was validated because the effect
on interstate commerce was "incidental at best and clearly not
excessive when weighed against the legitimate and concededly
laudable goal of controlling the noise levels at the Hayward
" 411 U.S. 624 (1973).
" Id. at 633.
Id. at 635-36 n.14.
"Id.
" 418 F. Supp. 417 (N.D. Cal. 1976).
I d. at 429.
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Air Terminal during late evening and early morning hours."2"
The ordinance, therefore, was a rational means to a "legiti-
mate" and "laudable" end that did not interfere with federal
control over interstate commerce.
The Hayward analysis was later followed in British Airways
v. Port Authority of New York and New Jersey. 0 The Second
Circuit, in reversing a summary judgment order in favor of
the defendant Concorde operators, held that the Port Author-
ity could set noise standards for supersonic transport (SST)
flights into and out of Kennedy International (JFK), provided
they were reasonable and non-discriminatory."1 The court
noted that the amicus brief filed by the United States urged
that the Secretary of Transportation never intended to de-
prive the Port Authority of the right to condition utilization
of JFK on the SST's compliance with reasonable noise regula-
tions.3 2 The court also cited Secretary Coleman's statement
before a House Committee which declared that an airport
proprietor's imposition of a "non-discriminatory" ban on
SSTs would not be preempted by FAA action, so long as it
did not constitute an "unreasonable burden on interstate and
foreign commerce.""3 The cause was remanded to the district
court with instructions to determine whether the temporary
ban on SST flights into and out of JFK, that met the Port
Authority's existing noise standards, was reasonable.3 ' On re-
mand the district court enjoined the enforcement of the Port
Authority's ban. 5 The order was appealed to the Second Cir-
cuit where it was affirmed, with the modification that the Port
Authority was free to promulgate new, reasonable noise
regulations.3 6
British Airways was by no means a blow against state or
3" Id. at 427.
30 558 F.2d. 75 (2d Cir. 1977).
31 Id. at 78.
" Id. at 81.
Id. at 82.
Id. at 86.
" British Airways Bd. v. Port Auth., 437 F. Supp. 804 (S.D.N.Y.), modified, 564
F.2d 1002 (2d Cir. 1977).
1o 564 F.2d at 1012-13.
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local noise regulation. It permitted a proprietor with rulemak-
ing authority, a hybrid combination, to impose noise stan-
dards on particular types of aircraft. An outright ban on cer-
tain aircraft, however, seems unlikely, due to the
reasonableness standard utilized by the court. The British
Airways case, nonetheless, emphasizes that the delay in
adopting reasonable regulations, rather than the mere attempt
to regulate airport noise, necessitated the lifting of the ban.
IV. ILLINOIS POLLUTION CONTROL BOARD JURISDICTION OVER
THE AIRPORT NOISE PROPOSAL
Although Hayward and British Airways dealt with munici-
pal and regional airport proprietors' noise control authority,
they serve to support non-preemption of state airport noise
regulation. The two cases outline a few measures which are
not per se federally preempted, that a proprietor may con-
sider in abating airport noise. By defining the scope of permis-
sible proprietary airport noise control, these cases also define
the scope of state noise control at airports operated by its po-
litical subordinates.
Air Transport Association of America v. Crotti87 was the
first case to advance the theory that an airport proprietor,
which is a political subdivision of the state, is subject to the
airport noise regulations of a state agency over areas not pre-
empted by federal law.38 In Crotti, the court stated: "it is now
firmly established that the airport proprietor is responsible
for consequences which attend his operation of a public air-
port; his right to control the use of the airport is a necessary
concomitant whether it be directed by the state police power
or his own initiative."' 9 The court, in a footnote, declared that
"[t]he power of the State to generally regulate its political
subordinates, including local airport authorities, is well estab-
lished as a matter of law."'40
In Crotti, two types of regulation were examined. The Com-
37 389 F. Supp. 58 (N.D. Cal. 1975).
Id. at 64.
Id. at 63-64.
,o Id. at 64 n.2.
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munity Noise Equivalent Level (CNEL), which was upheld by
the court, focused on prescribed maximum noise level and on
land use limitations. The court held that, because this regula-
tion did not affect "a field of aircraft operation engaged in
direct flight," it was not preempted."' The Single Event Noise
Exposure Levels (SENEL) were preempted, however, because
they measured noise of aircraft while in direct flight, and,
therefore, infringed upon the exclusive domain of federal reg-
ulation.42 Crotti, consequently, provides support for the Illi-
nois airport noise proposal.
The Crotti opinion was criticized in San Diego Unified Port
District v. Gianturco." The court for the Southern District of
California invalidated a curfew imposed upon the San Diego
Unified Port District's Lindbergh Field by the California De-
partment of Transportation (CDOT). The court held that the
CDOT, as a non-proprietor, was preempted from regulating
airport noise." The Crotti "control theory" was rejected be-
cause the California Legislature specifically had created San
Diego Unified Port District and had given it proprietary
powers.'8
Because of the specificity of the legislation, the court
viewed CDOT as not having any authority over the proprie-
tary responsibilities of San Diego Unified Port District. In the
case of O'Hare Airport, however, Illinois law simply allows
municipalities of five-hundred thousand persons or more to
operate their own airports.4' No special statute governs the
operation of O'Hare. Gianturco, therefore, does not address a
situation like that of O'Hare, and has little precedential value
as a statement against state regulation of O'Hare airport
noise.
The district court also based its preemption finding on the
following "telling observation" by the Supreme Court in Bur-
bank: "We are not at liberty to diffuse the powers given by
" Id at 65.
4I Id.
" 457 F. Supp. 283 (S.D. Cal. 1978), a/I'd, 651 F.2d 1306 (9th Cir. 1981).
, 457 F. Supp at 294.
" Id. at 293.
" ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 24, § 11-102-5 (Smith-Hurd 1962).
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Congress to the FAA and EPA by letting the State or munici-
palities in on the planning. If the change is to be made, Con-
gress alone must do it.",7 The district court, however, sub-
verted its own argument by admitting the proprietor-
developed airport noise abatement programs are endorsed by
the FAA, and that the Supreme Court has declined to hold
that federal preemption of airport noise excludes proprietors
from regulating noise at their own airports. 8 Gianturco, fur-
thermore, like Burbank, does not address the powers of a mu-
nicipality as a proprietor.
Chicago and other municipalities that operate airports,
under the Crotti view, can have their proprietary prerogatives
influenced by the state of which they are political subdivi-
sions."9 Under Gianturco, special authorities established by
specific statutes are not political subordinates that can be
controlled by other state agencies. Gianturco does not suggest
that a municipality operating an airport, under a generic
grant of authority by the state, cannot be subjected to the
noise control regulations of a state agency. A strong rationale
supports the proposition that the airport noise proposal
before the IPCB, at least as it pertains to O'Hare, is not pre-
empted on the grounds that the IPCB is not an airport
proprietor10
V. THE AIRPORT NOISE PROPOSAL BEFORE THE ILLINOIS
POLLUTION CONTROL BOARD
A. Definitions and Enforcement
The proposal before the IPCB submitted by the Illinois at-
torney general seeks to set maximum permissible levels for
noise emitted to noise sensitive property by publicly owned
11 457 F. Supp. at 291 (quoting City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc.,
411 U.S. 624, 640 (1973)).
11 457 F. Supp. at 291.
"' But see National Aviation v. City of Hayward, 418 F. Supp. 417, 423 (N.D. Cal.
1976).
50 The record indicates that the' IPCB was made aware of both the Burbank and
Crotti decisions at the first hearing on the airport noise proposal. Airport Noise Hear-
ings, supra note 3, at 42, 58 (June 17, 1977) (statements by Professor Plager).
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airports.5 1 Levels are to be measured in Ldn, a day/night aver-
age sound level, 2 and airports are to gradually reduce their
noise emissions over noise sensitive land to comply with a
standard that will become more stringent in the future.5 This
The Illinois Attorney General's proposal and amendments [hereinafter cited as
AG Noise Proposal] are part of the record in Illinois Airport Noise Proposal, No. R-
77-4 (Ill. Pollution Control Bd., filed Feb. 16, 1977) which is available at the Chicago
offices of the IPCB, 309 West Washington, Suite 300.
Only a proposed rule of the IPCB, not a proposal to the IPCB for rulemaking,
would be published in the Illinois Register. See Illinois Environmental Protection Act
§ 28, para. 4, Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 111- 1/2, § 1028, para. 4 (1981), and Illinois Administra-
tive Procedure Act §§ 3.09, 5.01(a), ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 127, §§ 1003.09, 1005.01(a)
(1981).
"' Rules 101(u) and 101(v) of the AG Noise Proposal filed June 12, 1978, supra
note 51, provides:
(u) Equivalent Sound Level (LEq): [is defined as]
The constant sound level that, in a given situation and time period, conveys the
same sound energy as the actual time-varying A-weighted sound, measured in deci-
bels. The mathematical definition of LEq for an interval defined as occupying the
period between two points in time t, and t1 is:
LEq = 10 log [ 1 _t 2  P(t) dt]
t, -t t, Po
Where P(t) is the time varying sound pressure and Po is a reference pressure taken at
20 micropascals.
(v) Equivalent Day - Night Sound Level (Ldn): [is defined]
The equivalent A-weighted sound level during a 24 hour period with a 10 decibel
weighting applied to the equivalent sound level during the night-time hours of 10:00
p.m. to 7:00 a.m. The mathematical definition of Ldn is:
I Ld Ln + 10
Ldn = 10 log 24 [15 (10 10). + 9 (1010 )
Ld = LEq for the daytime (7:00 a.m. - 10:00 p.m.)
Ln = LEq for the nighttime (10:00 p.m. - 7:00 a.m.).
" Amended Rules 503(1) - 503(3) (B) of the AG Noise Proposal filed Nov. 14, 1979
are alternative proposals concerning compliance deadlines. The proposals, in perti-
nent parts, are set forth below:
Alternative #1
Rule 503 (1):
After the dates specified in Table 6, no municipality or other subdivision of the
State which is the proprietor of any airport shall cause or allow aircraft operations at
such airport to create an equivalent day-night sound level on any receiving Class A
land in excess of the limits specified in Table 6:
TABLE 6
Date Limit
effective date of part 5 80 Ldn
December 31, 1980 75 Ldn
December 31, 1986 65 Ldn
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approach corresponds with the IPCB's authority to control
noise emitted beyond property boundaries."'
Although the proposal simply requires compliance with the
Ldn standard for the applicable year,50 enforcement would be
difficult. The proposed regulation is to be enforced against
airports that violate an annual average and is not intended to
punish the airport experiencing an occasional noisy day
caused by weather conditions or other factors. 56 The propo-
nents of the regulation, however, did not feel that twenty-four
hour monitoring for a three-hundred sixty-five day period




After the dates specified in Table 7, no municipality or other subdivision of the
State which is the proprietor of any airport shall cause or allow aircraft operations at
such airport to create an equivalent day-night sound level on any receiving Class A
land in excess of the limits specified in Table 7.
TABLE 7
Date Limit
effective date of Part 5 80 Ldn
December 31, 1985 65 Ldn




(B) After the dates specified in Table 9, no municipality or other subdivision of the
State which is the proprietor of any airport with a total one-thousand [sic] or more
aircraft takeoffs and landings per day shall cause or allow aircraft operations at such
airport to create an equivalent day-night sound level on any receiving Class A land in
excess of the limits specified in Table 9.
TABLE 9
Date Limit
effective day of Part 5 95 Ldn
December 31, 1983 90 Ldn
December 31, 1985 80 Ldn
Illinois Environmental Protection Act § 25, Ill. Rev. Stat, ch. 111-1/2, § 1025
(1981).
" AG Noise Proposal filed Nov. 14, 1979, supra note 51, Rules 503(1)-(3)(B).
The equation is an average, therefore, the proprietor would not be penalized if a
high number of operations occurred on one runway because of wind conditions. Air-
port Noise Hearings, supra note 3, at 2,438 (April 10, 1978) (statement by Mr.
Studholme).
57 A violation could be determined with a high degree of accuracy from twenty-four
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debate between the attorney general's witnesses and the attor-
neys for the various groups that opposed the regulation re-
sulted in the modification of the proposal by the Illinois attor-
ney general, under which the IPCB would be given the task of
determining if the monitoring data sufficiently proves a viola-
tion.58 An earlier provision granted a rebuttable presumption
of validity to the enforcement agency's conclusion that moni-
toring data indicated a violation of the annual standard was
eliminated.59
The Illinois attorney general, at the same time, added a
provision requiring airports to do continuous noise monitoring
and reporting to aid enforcement.10 The major objection to
hours of monitoring if one sample of each type and weight of aircraft were made. Id.
If average weather conditions were within a stipulated limit, then there would be
certainty as to accuracy. Id. at 2,441.
" Rule 508 of the AG Noise Proposal filed June 12, 1978, supra note 51, states:
Measurements and/or calculations conducted in accordance with pro-
cedures adopted by the Agency pursuant to Rule 103(e) of Chapter 8,
shall be acceptable as evidence of violations of this Part 5 [Airport
Noise]. The weight to be accorded such evidence shall be determined
by the Pollution Control Board in each enforcement action in which
such evidence shall be admitted.
" Rule 304 of the AG Noise Proposal filed Feb. 16, 1977, supra note 51, states:
Any calculation of Ldn using any of the three methods listed in this
Rule 304, which indicates a violation of any of the standards of this
Part 3 [Airport Noise], shall raise a rebuttable presumption that there
is in fact a violation of such standard:
(1) "Community Noise Exposure Resulting from Aircraft Op-
erations; Computer Program Operator's Manual," AMRL TR
73-108, Aerospace Medical Research Laboratory, Wright Patter-
son Air Force Base, Ohio July 1975.
(2) "Airport Noise Reduction Forcast, Volume II - NEF Com-
puter Program Description and User's Manual," U.S. Dept. of
Transp., DOT-TST 75-4, October 1975.
(3) "Calculation of Day-Night Levels (Ldn) Resulting from
Civil Aircraft Operations," EPA 550/9-77-450.
60 Rule 504 of the AG Noise Proposal filed June 12, 1978 supra note 51, states:
A. Each airport proprietor subject to this regulation shall maintain
records containing the following data for each runway at the airport:
(1) The number of each of the following types of aircraft arriv-
ing during the day (7:00 a.m.- 10:00 p.m.), and the number ar-
riving during the night (10:00 p.m. - 7:00 a.m.): 747, DC-10, L-
1011, DC-8, 707, 727-100, 727-200, 727 advanced, DC-9, 737,
business jets (by type), military jets (by type), helicopters.
(2) For each of the aircraft types listed in subsection (1), the
number of departures by day (7:00 a.m. - 10:00 p.m.) and the
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this provision was cost of implementation. 1 However, the ex-
pense to O'Hare for such monitoring was characterized as af-
fordable, when compared to the proportional costs that
smaller airports would have to bear.s2 Another hotly disputed
issue was the proposal's ban on any airport expansion that
would produce impermissible noise levels on Class A receiving
land."3 The proposal originally defined expansion as any mod-
ification that potentially could increase airport noise,"' but
the proposal was later amended to define expansion as a mod-
ification that increases noise impact.65 This change could be
considered an attempt to balance the "investment backed ex-
number of departures by night (10:00 p.m. - 7:00 a.m.) for each
of the following stage lengths: 0-500 miles, 500-1,000 miles,
1,000 - 1,500 miles, 1,500 - 2,500 miles, 2,500 - 3,500 miles, 3,500
- 4,500 miles, over 4,500 miles.
B. The records maintained pursuant to subsection A shall be submit-
ted to the [Illinois] Environmental Protection Agency within fifteen
days of the last day of each calendar month.
The Assistant Attorney General was informed on examination that a California
airport recently installed a noise monitoring system at a cost of $152,000 and that the
maintenance and operation cost is estimated at $100,000 per year. Airport Noise
Hearings, supra note 3, at 2,793 (May 5, 1978).
62 See Id. at 2,408 (April 10, 1978) (statement of E. Studholme). The Assistant
Attorney General did not think that $100,000 per year in noise monitoring expenses
would be excessive for O'Hare. See Id. at 2,795 (May 5, 1978) (statement of Assistant
Attorney General Blackwood).
" Rule 502 of the AG Noise Proposal filed June 12, 1978, supra note 51, states:
After the effective date of this Part 5, no municipality or other sub-
division of the State which is the proprietor of any airport shall cause
or allow any airport expansion at such airport, if such airport expan-
sion would create an equivalent day-night sound level in excess of 65
Ldn on any receiving Class A land which was not previously subject to
an equivalent day-night sound level in excess of 65 Ldn.
6 Rule 101 (y) of the AG Noise Proposal filed February 16, 1977, supra note 51,
states:
Airport Expansion
Any construction of new runways, lengthening or modification of ex-
isting runways, increase in the number of aircraft operations, change
in schedules of aircraft operations, or change in the type of aircraft
operating at an airport, which could potentially increase the noise im-
pact of the airport.
15 Rule 101 (x) of the AG Noise Proposal filed June 12, 1978, supra note 51, states:
Airport Expansion:
Any change or modification to airport property or airport opera-
tions, including but not limited to type and number of aircraft and
aircraft operating procedures, that increases the noise impact of the
airport.
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pectations" of the airport proprietor and O'Hare area
residents."
The attorney general's change of heart could be interpreted
as an acknowledgement that individuals who live by airports
have limited expectations concerning their future noise envi-
ronment; however, the amendment probably was added be-
cause there was little, if any, evidence of property deprecia-
tion among homeowners near O'Hare that would support
protection from potential harm.17 Furthermore, noise con-
scious citizens would develop expectations of noise reduction
if they became aware of the future requirements for aircraft
operation and certification." Any optimism that the O'Hare
area homeowners may have had, on the other hand, may al-
ready have been eradicated by the indifference that the City
of Chicago has exhibited in the past. 9 The IPCB, neverthe-
less, received testimony from homeowners concerning the date
that they purchased their homes, their knowledge of the air-
port noise at the time of purchase, the amount of jet traffic at
O'Hare at the time of purchase, and modification and expan-
sion of O'Hare in recent years.7 0 Because the noise standards
See generally Penn Central Transp. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978) (the
extent to which regulation interferes with the distinct investment backed expectation
of the property owner is a relevant consideration in "taking" cases); Kaiser Aetna v.
United States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979) (the government must condemn and pay for suffi-
cient important expectancies embodied in the concept of property before it takes over
the management of the landowner's property). These cases support the notion that
the government, prior to adopting regulations, should consider the reasonable expec-
tations that owners have for the property affected.
"' For example, one witness testified that she moved because of airport noise but
was able to sell her home in three weeks without taking a price cut. Airport Noise
Hearings, supra note 3, at 219, 223 (June 17, 1977) (statements by Ellen Paulson).
68 See Noise Limits, supra note 7.
m9 See Airport Noise Hearings, supra note 3, at 184, 235-36 (June 17, 1977) (state-
ments by Park Ridge Mayor Butler and Glenview Village President Smith that their
municipalites were not informed of the contents of the O'Hare master plan despite
requests, nor were they notified of runway changes).
10 Id. at 124-25 (statements by Ms. Lebda); Id. at 234 (statements by Glenview
Village President Smith); Id at 315-25 (statements by Mr. Richardson, Director of
Des Plaines Planning and Zoning); Id. at 326-27 (statements by Ms. Jacobsen); Id. at
348 (statements by Ms. Bates); Id. at 353 (statements by Ms. Murphy); Id. at 372-73
(statements by Ms. Mushow); Id. at 399-400 (statements by Ms. India); Id. at 430
(statements by Mr. Bronas).
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were based upon annoyance levels 7 1 and annoyance entails
frustration of expectation, the IPCB allowed the testimony in
order to aid the assessment of the standards' reasonableness.
B. Variance Considerations
The most controversial provision of the proposal is the vari-
ance procedure which mandates that the airport proprietor
consider certain noise abatement methods which are under
the authority of an agency, commission, or administration
other than the airport. The procedure requires that the pro-
prietor make a good faith effort to elicit the cooperation of the
FAA, zoning boards, and municipal governments in reducing
noise at the airport.72 The provision also requires that the pe-
titioner for the variance submit noise, zoning, and demo-
graphic information to the IPCB to aid the determination of
good faith.7 3
Due to the Board's refusal to postpone hearings to consider
constitutional and statutory issues," the airline and pilot as-
sociations intended to demonstrate that the proposal's sug-
gested abatement options, which must be addressed in a vari-
ance petition, alone could not bring O'Hare into compliance
7 See Airport Noise Hearings, supra note 3, at 842-45, 888, 895, September 28,
1977 (statements by Dr. von Gierke, Director of Biodynamic and Bioenergy Division
of the Aerospace Medical Research Laboratory of the United States Air Force).
"' Rules 505 B(3) and 505 B(4) of the AG Noise Proposal filed June 12, 1978, supra
note 51, states that such plan must show:
(3) That the proprietor of the airport has made good faith efforts to
induce the Federal Aviation Administration to implement each of the
noise abatement options designated (k) through (n) above which would
reduce the noise impact of the airport.
(4) That the proprietor of the airport has made good faith efforts to
induce the appropriate land use control authorities to implement the
noise abatement options designated (o) and (p) above which would re-
duce the noise impact of the airport.
Rule 505 B(1) of the AG Noise Proposal filed June 12, 1978, supra note 51,
states:
The consideration of each of these options must include estimates of
the reduction in land area and population presently impacted by air-
port noise in excess of the limits of this Part 5 (or, in the case of Op-
tion (o), potentially impacted in the future) which it could achieve,
and its costs or effects on the service provided by the airport.
74 In re Airport Noise Regulations, 25 P.C.B. 543 (1977).
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with proposed standards and deadlines.7 5 Such a demonstra-
tion was intended to prove the proposal ineffective and un-
realistic as it applies to O'Hare - the state's largest source of
airport noise. Seemingly this would undermine one of the pri-
mary considerations of the proposal."6
The best manner, however, in which to analyze the pros-
pects of noise abatement at O'Hare in the future is to review
each variance consideration separately. The variance consider-
ations fall into two general categories and will be analyzed
accordingly.
1. Noise Abatement Actions That Can Be Directly
Implemented By The Proprietor
a. Limitations on the Types and Number of Aircraft,
Based Upon Noise Emission Characteristics, Which
May Use The Airport"
Limitations based upon noise emission characteristics of
aircraft require that the proprietor deny use of the airport to
planes which are noisy. The attorney general presumed that
airlines that are dependent upon O'Hare will quiet their fleets
through retrofitting or replacement.78 The economics of such a
transition, however, suggest that restructuring the fleets
before the Part 36 deadline 7  is unlikely.80 The implementa-
78 This strategy became most apparent in the testimony of an Air Transport Asso-
ciation representative who concluded that the only noise abatement options left at
O'Hare are flight reductions and curfews which interfere with interstate commerce,
foreign commerce, and postal service. Airport Noise Hearings, supra note 3, at 3,111
(July 27, 1978) (statements by General von Kann).
76 Airport Noise Hearings, supra note 3, at 2,703 (May 5, 1978) (statement by As-
sistant Attorney General Blackwood).
" Rules 505 B(1)(a) and 505 B(1)(b) of the AG Noise Proposal filed June 12, 1978,
supra note 51.
78 The Attorney General obviously thought he could hasten the implementation of
the federal approach to aircraft noise abatement. The federal program calls for appli-
cation of acoustical technology (retrofitting) on non-complying planes as a method of
meeting federal noise requirements. See 14 C.F.R. § 91.308(c)(4)(ix) (1981). The fed-
eral approach primarily contemplates replacing the older model jets with newer, qui-
eter aircraft. See 14 C.F.R. § 91.306 (1981).
79 Noise Standards: Aircraft Type and Airworthiness Certification, 14 C.F.R. § 36
(1981).
" According to Air Transport Association estimates, the airlines will spend $425
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tion of the consideration at O'Hare would then place the pro-
prietor in the position of potentially interfering with inter-
state commerce.81
Interference with interstate commerce presents the most
compelling ground upon which to challenge an O'Hare aircraft
noise limitation. Because O'Hare is a central link in American
air commerce, 82 any regulation that bans certain commercial
aircraft, for even a short time, from using the airport would
probably have a substantial effect on interstate commerce. 8
The provision would reduce operations during the replace-
ment period, and replacement of aircraft rather than retrofit-
ting would be the only practical way to quiet the fleet.8
Courts would presumably view a one or two year cutback of
flights at O'Hare as an undue burden on interstate commerce.
British Airways5 resulted in a finding that a thirteen month
ban on SST's pending promulgation of special standards for
supersonic aircraft was discriminatory, excessive, and an un-
due burden on interstate commerce. In the case of O'Hare,
standards would be in existence; consequently, the discrimina-
tion present in the British Airways controversy would be ab-
sent from the O'Hare scenario. The slowdown in operations at
O'Hare, however, still would be unduly burdensome on inter-
million on retrofitting, $1.6 billion on re-engining, $4.6 billion on replacing aircraft,
and another $1 billion on spares associated with replacement and re-engining before
fully complying with federal aircraft noise requirements. Airport Noise Hearings,
supra note 3, at 3,092-93 (July 27, 1978) (statements by General von Kann).
"' The health and safety considerations of the state (including its political subdivi-
sions) are balanced against the national interest in economical and efficient transpor-
tation in determining whether the state has violated the Commerce Clause, U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. See Raymond Motor Transp., Inc. v. Rice, 434 U.S. 429
(1978); Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc., 359 U.S. 520 (1959); Southern Pacific Co.
v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761 (1945).
82 Airport Noise Hearings, supra note 3, at 3,074 (July 27, 1978) (statement by
General von Kann).
Cf. Raymond Motor Transp., Inc. v. Rice, 434 U.S. 429 (1978) (invalidating Wis-
consin ban on double trailers); Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, 359 U.S. 520 (1959)
(invalidating Illinois requirement of special mudflaps on trucks).
Airport Noise Hearings, supra note 3, at 1,108 (November 29, 1977) (statement
by Mr. Tyler, witness for proponent); Id. at 948 (Sept. 28, 1977) (statement by Dr.
von Gierke).
sB British Airways Bd. v. Port Auth., 437 F. Supp. 804, 818 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 564
F.2d 1002 (2d Cir. 1977).
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state commerce.86
b. Limitations on the Time of Day During which
Aircraft that Do Not Meet the Certification Noise
Limits of Part 36 of the Federal Aviation
Regulations May Use the Airport, and Limitations
on Airport Operating Hours.8 7
Limitations on times when noisy aircraft may use the air-
port and limitations on airport operating hours are designed
to promote a ban on some or all nighttime operations. Al-
though a ban would affect air passenger operations, 8 it would
have its greatest impact upon air cargo operations89
The majority of all-cargo operations, as opposed to flights
combining passengers and freight, occur during evening
hours.90 A substantial number of the aircraft utilized in the
all-cargo night operations at O'Hare are not in compliance
with Part 36.91 A significant percentage of the mail is also de-
8 The cost of operations cutbacks at O'Hare far outweigh their benefit. To achieve
compliance with the proposed standards, O'Hare would have to reduce its operations
by forty-five percent. As a result, employment in the Chicago area would be reduced
by 49,000 jobs and would cause a negative economic impact of approximately
$2,000,000,000 to the regional economy. ILLINOIS INSTITUTE OF NATURAL RESOURCES,
OPINION OF THE ECONOMIC TECHNICAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE (Nov. 15, 1981), included
in ECONOMIC IMPACT STUDY supra note 2, at v [hereinafter cited as IINR, Opinion of
ETAC].
81 Rules 505(B)(1)(a) and 505(B)(1)(h) of the AG Noise Proposal filed June 12,
1978, supra note 51.
"8 Airport Noise Hearings, supra note 3, Exhibit 136 (comparative report of cargo
and passenger operations at O'Hare, Jan. through Dec., 1977).
89 All commercial air operations during the hours of 10:00 P.M. through 7:00 A.M.
in February of 1980 carried freight. Fifty-five percent of these night flights carried
passengers and cargo while the remaining forty-five percent carried only cargo. About
seventy-four percent of the all-cargo flights for the month occurred between 10:00
P.M. an 7:00 A.M. See ECONOMIC IMPACT STUDY, supra note 2 at 50, 56, and 61.
90 In 1980, 88 of the 119 daily all-cargo operations at O'Hare occurred between the
hours of 10:00 P.M. and 7:00 A.M. Id. at 67.
" Flying Tigers, the world's largest all-cargo airline, accounted for seventy percent
of the scheduled all-cargo operations at O'Hare in 1979. These flights represented
about one percent of the total operations at O'Hare. Flying Tigers' fleet consisted of
twenty-one "stretch" DC-8 airplanes and nine 747 freighters in 1980. Airport Noise
Hearings, supra note 3, at 4,711-12 (April 8, 1980) (statement by Peter E. Hubbard,
Vice President of the Midwest Region for Flying Tigers). The imposition of a ban on
non-Part 36 aircraft operations would greatly interfere with Flying Tigers' DC-8 oper-
ations. See Noise Limits for Subsonic Transport Category Large Airplanes and Sub-
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livered on night flights."2 A limitation on the hours of airport
operation would most logically occur as a curfew banning op-
erations during the night when the fewest operations are
scheduled9 3 and the probability of sleep disturbance is high-
est. To ban operations during evening hours would seriously
interrupt the overnight repair of industrial machinery, and
therefore, cause expensive delays in production. The over-
night delivery of documents, medicines, and other items in
immediate demand would also be jeopardized.
The thought of delaying operations until morning at O'Hare
is untenable.9 4 O'Hare's operational schedule is so full that at
least thirty-three percent of its night operations could not be
inserted into the following day's timetable.9 5 Rescheduling
night flights to daytime could result in a safety loss from in-
creased air traffic that might outweigh the benefits of noise
reduction.' The overall effect of an O'Hare curfew on inter-
sonic Turbojet Powered Airplanes, 14 C.F.R. § 36.201 and Operating Noise Limits 14
C.F.R. §§ 91.301-91.308 (1981).
*2 Estimates indicate that nine to thirty-four percent of the mail at O'Hare would
be delayed by a night curfew. See ECONOMIC IMPACT STUDY, supra note 2, at 75.
93 About 10 percent of the commercial air carrier operations occur during the hours
of 10:00 P.M. through 7:00 A.M. Id. at 50.
9 AIRPORT NOISE HEARINGS, supra note 3, at 4,027 (Dec. 5, 1979) (statement by Ian
Bamber, Flight Planner for United Airlines). The demand for airplane flights is not
elastic. Each scheduled flight is the response to a particular need to fly at a particular
time. Id.
A curfew at O'Hare would affect scheduling throughout the country. The difference
in time zones when coupled with a night curfew at O'Hare would mean that no flight
to O'Hare from the west coast could depart later than 4:30 p.m. Pacific time. Id. at
4,034.
The curfew would also eliminate the first morning flight to New York from O'Hare
because the aircraft used could not arrive in the evening at O'Hare, be serviced over-
night, and stand ready for takeoff in the morning. Id. at 4,019.
" See ECONOMIC IMPACT STUDY, supra note 2, at 51-52.
There is some evidence that O'Hare is not currently at its full air traffic control
capacity. Id. at 3,180. To achieve capacity, delays would have to be minimized. De-
lays, however, cannot be minimized if runways are utilized in a manner that best
reduces noise. Airport Noise Hearings, supra note 3, at 3,180 (July 27, 1981) (state-
ment by General von Kahn).
Preferential runway use designed to abate noise at O'Hare, furthermore, nay not
be realistic from a safety perspective. Id. at 2,927. A curfew added to attempts to
minimize daytime delays, therefore, would increase noise during the day, would elimi-
nate those operations which could not be inserted into the daytime schedule, and
would increase daytime operations so that the airport would be operating at its lowest
acceptable safety level (air traffic control capacity). A curfew joined with daytime
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state commerce would be devastating.97
Evidence of noise reduction from a nighttime ban is unim-
pressive. The curfew would reduce noise through operation
cutbacks. A fifty percent reduction in operations, with reten-
tion of the same percentage aircraft mix, however, would only
result in approximately a three decibel reduction in total
Ldn.'5 If the fifty percent reduction was of the noisiest flights,
then a reduction slightly greater than three decibels would re-
sult,"9 but an operation cutback of this magnitude would cer-
tainly interfere substantially with interstate commerce. Re-
ducing nighttime operations, therefore, is an impractical and
ineffective method of reducing O'Hare's noise impact.
c. Changes in Location or Operation of Ground Run-
up Areas 00
In order to test the working order of an airplane engine, it
must be started and accelerated while on the ground. This
process, commonly called "run-up," produces engine noise
which further adds to the airport noise problem. Testimony at
the IPCB hearings neither identified run-ups at O'Hare as a
problem nor disclosed to what degree run-up noise is being
controlled."'1 Run-ups ideally should be done with the fewest
number of engines and noise should be directed at the least
populated area or into a sound absorbent structure.
noise abatement procedures would allow few, if any, nighttime operations to be re-
scheduled during the day and would conceivably decrease safety at the airport.
97 A curfew at O'Hare would affect 65,400 aircraft operations at O'Hare between
10:00 p.m. and 7:00 a.m. annually and would eliminate 3,685,000 night coach fares.
See IINR, opinion of ETAC, supra note 86, at iv.
98 Airport Noise Hearings, supra note 3, at 2,188 (March 9, 1978) (statement by
Robert Hellweg, Division of Noise Pollution Control, Technical Operations Section of
the Illinois Environmental Protection Agency).
" A reduction of approximately 3.2 decibels at O'Hare to comply with the initial
80 Ldn limit can be achieved through a forty-five percent decrease in operations.
IINR, 'pinion of ETAC, supra note 86, at 3. See also L. Dupre, Annual Day-Night
Sound Levels Near Illinois Commercial Airports, IEPA Technical Report No. N 78-1,
A 1 (March, 1978).
100 Rule 505B(1)(g) of the AG Noise Proposal filed June 12, 1978, supra note 51, at
v.
101 Airport Noise Hearings, supra note 3, at 3,374 (July 28, 1978) (statement by H.
Benninghoff, Vice President of Flying for American Airlines, that run up location at
O'Hare has been studied).
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The amount of abatement is determined by the fleet com-
position. Unless an engine is equipped with an auxiliary power
unit, all engines must be started inboard.102 Only a few types
of planes can run-up with fewer than all engines operating
simultaneously. 103
From a practical viewpoint, changing run-up areas can be
accomplished easily, since FAA consent is not needed and in-
terstate commerce is unaffected. Banning nighttime run-ups,
however, would delay maintenance and affect flight schedules.
The small number of citizen complaints concerning run-ups
and the indication that O'Hare has already studied the prob-
lem' 04 suggest that run-up changes can reduce noise a very
small amount, if at all.
d. Limitations on the Total Number of Aircraft
Operations To Be Permitted at the Airport During
Nighttime Hours0 5
Limiting the number of operations during nighttime is a
modified curfew that would not necessarily discriminate ac-
cording to aircraft type or reduce airport operating hours. The
attorney general, in proposing this option, reasoned that
flights could be reduced without sacrificing service if planes
with more seats than those currently in operation during the
evening were substituted. '" This abatement option could be
implemented with a minimal reduction in service, provided
that O'Hare has two or more arrivals to or departures from
the same airport during the evening. If services to or from a
city during a particular time of day, however, were eliminated
at O'Hare by the limitation, an adverse effect on interstate
commerce would result.
Because the number of flights at O'Hare indicates that
some cities handle more than one flight per evening to or from
:0, Id. at 3,458-59 (Sept. 25, 1978) (testimony of H. Benninghof).
108 Id.
104 Id. at 3,374 (July 28, 1978).
108 Rule 505B(1)(i) of the AG Noise Proposal filed June 12, 1978, supra note 51.
101 Airport Noise Hearings, supra note 3, at 2,685 (May 5, 1978) (statement by
Assistant Attorney General Blackwood).
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O'Hare, the night limit could potentially abate noise at the
airport. The amount of noise reduction would depend upon
the number of flights eliminated and the noise characteristics
of the replacement aircraft. These factors in turn would be
dependent upon scheduling, the composition of the fleet of
the affected airlines, and the ability of the paired airport to
handle larger planes. Noise reduction would not come solely
from the reduction of flights, but also from substituting larger,
quieter, wide-bodied aircraft for the narrow-bodied planes.
Because this option integrates two noise abatement tech-
niques and, potentially could be implemented with a rela-
tively small effect on interstate commerce, it is theoretically a
legally and technologically feasible noise abatement alterna-
tive for O'Hare. It is dependent, however, on the existence of
multiple nighttime operations between O'Hare and a particu-
lar city. Only a few operations could be reduced without sig-
nificantly affecting service. This procedure alone, furthermore,
would probably not perceivably reduce the noise problem at
O'Hare. 0 7
e. A Program for Gradually Increasing the Proportion
of Operations by Aircraft Which Meet the
Certification Noise Limits of Part 36 of the Federal
Aviation Regulations.0 8
An increase in the percentage of aircraft that comply with
Part 36 (Part 36 aircraft) at O'Hare differs from the proce-
dure of limiting the number of certain types of aircraft based
on noise emission characteristics, because it does not necessa-
rily require a reduction in operations during the period in
which the airlines are acquiring fleets quieter than their pre-
sent ones. The use of percentage limits, rather than numerical
limits, would give the airlines flexibility in their negotiations
and decisionmaking. Airlines would not be forced to acquire
immediately Part 36 aircraft to preserve the volume of their
operations at O'Hare, and thus impair their ability to meet
107 See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
108 Rule 505B(1)(j) of the AG Noise Proposal filed June 12, 1978, supra note 51.
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long range certification requirements. The airlines could ad-
just aircraft assignments, if feasible, to comply with the
O'Hare percentage limitation.
If other airports imposed similar aircraft mix requirements,
or if the O'Hare percentage limitation became too cumber-
some, compliance from a practical standpoint would be diffi-
cult to achieve. From a legal point of view, the O'Hare per-
centage requirement would be subject to attack on
preemption grounds. To be non-discriminatory in their noise
abatement efforts, as mandated by Burbank'0 9 and the
FAA,110 the airports would probably require each airline to
meet the limitation. The practical result would be that air-
ports would enact regulations identical in purpose to the Part
91 Federal Aviation Regulations."' If the O'Hare fleet mix
percentage were stricter than the federal limits, which were
products of extensive economic consideration," 2 the O'Hare
limitation would be subject to preemption on commerce
clause grounds. 113
2. Noise Abatement Activities Requiring Federal
Approval.
a. Designation of Runways to Be Used by Aircraft
Which Do Not Meet the Certification Noise Limits
of Part 36 of the Federal Aviation Requirements""
Implementation of runway designation for noisy aircraft
would require FAA control tower approval,"' and theoreti-
cally would limit the noisiest planes to the runways from
which the noise impacts the fewest people. The effectiveness
of this method depends upon the number of operations," 6 the
109 City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc., 411 U.S. 624, 636 n.14 (1973).
1' Aircraft Noise Policy Hearings, supra note 33, (testimony of Secretary of Trans-
portation William T. Coleman, Jr.).
" 14 C.F.R. §§ 91.301-91.308 (1981).
E.g., S. REP. No. 52, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979).
, See supra notes 23-36.
.. Rule 505B(1)(d) of the AG Noise Proposal, filed June 12, 1978 supra note 51.
115 See AVIATION NOISE ABATEMENT POLICY, supra note 1.
l" If the airport is operating near its air traffic control capacity, few operations
could be diverted to "quiet" runways without causing delays.
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aircraft operation mix, 17 nature of residential encroach-
ment, 18 prevailing atmospheric conditions,"" the effect on
scheduling, 20 and the effect on safety.' With all these con-
tingencies, the prospects of appreciable noise reduction
through this technique are slim.
If the number of non-Part 36 aircraft were manageable,
then the abatement option could be used without causing de-
lays at O'Hare. The exact number of non-Part 36 aircraft us-
ing O'Hare, however, varies. 22 Furthermore, this option pre-
supposes that the O'Hare tower is not already designating
runways based on noise considerations.' s The effect on inter-
state commerce need not be analyzed because the proprietor
has no direct control over runway designation; the proprietor
can only make suggestions to the FAA.12 4
The percentage of operations involving non-Part 36 aircraft would have to be
small or else delays would be incurred trying to channel these flights to a quiet
runway.
"' The effectiveness of a noise abatement procedure is measured by the reduction
in number of people affected by noise and by the degree of noise reduction. The
efficacy of runway utilization change, therefore, depends upon the surrounding resi-
dential development.
"' Noisy airplanes cannot be diverted to preferential runways if wind or weather
conditions would affect the safety of operations. See Airport Noise Hearings, supra
note 3, at 1,134 (Nov. 29, 1977) (testimony of J. Tyler).
12o If the noise abatement procedure increases delays, the tower might not be able
to handle the same number of operations that it could normally control. Any reduc-
tion in operations would affect scheduling throughout the country. See Id. at 3,999
(Dec. 5, 1979) (testimony of Ian Bamber).
"I If planes are stacked in the air awaiting the use of a particular runway, air
traffic control is made more dificult. Excessive stacking can become a safety hazard.
"' The United States domestic aricraft fleet was estimated to be about 48.4% in
compliance with Part 36 standards as of January 1, 1981. 46 Fed. Reg. 40,126-27
(1981). Although seventy to ninety percent of the operations at the twenty-five major
U.S. airports involve 727's, 737's and DC 9's, these airplanes have only a slightly
lower compliance rate than the fleet as a whole. See H.R. REP. No. 836, 95th Cong.,
1st Sess. 7 (1977).
"' O'Hare to a large degree is using a preferential runway system.See Airport
Noise Hearings, supra note 3, at 1,131 (Nov. 29, 1977) (statement by J. Tyler). Id. at
3460-71 (Sept. 6, 1978) (statement by H. Benninghoff).
M' See AVIATION NoIsE ABATEMENT POLICY, supra note 1 for an explanation of the
division of duties and responsibilities of interested parties in reducing noise from air-
craft. Because the FAA has accepted legal responsibility for runway designation and
because the FAA-operated control tower exclusively determines the runway upon
which an aircraft will land, the proprietor of the airport does not have a role in the
designation of runways capable of significantly affecting interstate commerce.
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b. Noise Abatement Preferential Runway Systems For
All Aircraft12 5
Implementation of preferential runway systems for all air-
craft is essentially identical to the procedure of diverting non-
Part 36 aircraft to the runway that yields the lowest noise im-
pact. O'Hare is so busy that it might be impossible to divert
all non-Part 36 aircraft to a preferred runway, except at night.
The O'Hare tower, however, currently designates preferred
runways during the night."" Even if a preferential runway
system were utilized to its fullest potential, the decrease in
noise would be moderate.127 The increase in delay, however,
would be substantial.12 8 Consequently this option should not
be relied upon to contribute to noise abatement in the future
because the costs outweigh the benefits, thereby creating se-
vere commerce clause problems
c. Shifting Aircraft Operations to Neighboring
Airports.'2
9
Shifting O'Hare operations to neighboring airports totally
lacks viability as a noise abatement procedure. To bring
O'Hare within the proposed noise limitations would require a
drastic reduction in operations at the airport. 30 By the propo-
nent's own admission, shifting flights from O'Hare to Mid-
way' s ' or Rockford'82 might not reduce the overall noise im-
pact in the state. 3s Timing, kind of aircraft, and number of
people affected must be considered before determining if Mid-
1"6 Rule 505B(1)(e) of the AG Noise Proposal filed June 12, 1978, supra note 51.
126 See Airport Noise Hearings, supra note 3, at 3,461-62 (Sept. 24, 1978) (state-
ment by H. Benninghoff).
I If the number of flights were constant and the O'Hare operations were spread
from four to six runways, the annual Ldn would be lowered approximately 1.75 deci-
bels. Id. at 2,215 (Mar. 9, 1978) (statement by L. Dupre, Illinois Environmental Pro-
tection Agency).
11' Airport Noise Hearings, supra note 3, at 2,929 (May 23, 1978) (statement by E.
Studholme).
'3 Rule 505B(1)(f) of the AG Noise Proposal filed June 12, 1978 supra note 51.
'3 See IINR, Opinion of ETAC, supra note 86.
11 Airport Noise Hearings, supra note 3, at 2,667 (May 5, 1978) (statement by
Assistant Attorney General Blackwood).
13Z Id.
I" Id. at 2,669.
1982]
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
way or Rockford could receive shifted operations without ex-
ceeding the proposed noise limit."" Flights might not be able
to be shifted in some instances without Civil Aeronautic
Board approval.'35 Furthermore, because noise levels are loga-
rithmic calculations, rather than arithmetic calculations, a
large percentage of flights must be eliminated or shifted to
abate airport noise a comparatively small amount.136 Conse-
quently, flight shifting at O'Hare is an ineffective noise abate-
ment procedure.
d. Takeoff Noise Abatement Procedures'
Any procedure that affects the operation of an aircraft in
the navigable airspace of the United States can only be imple-
mented with FAA approval. 3 8 Takeoff and landing are the
two critical points of aircraft flight. It is during these two ma-
neuvers that safety becomes paramount. Because the FAA has
the responsibility to control aircraft safety,3 9 it must approve
all landing and takeoff procedures before they can be used.
The variance petition requirement that the proprietor con-
sider takeoff noise abatement procedures, mandates only that
the proprietor pursue the matter with the FAA in a good faith
manner.' " Because the FAA would have to approve of any
O'Hare takeoff noise abatement procedure, its legal feasibility
is not at issue. Technical feasibility, therefore, is the main
concern.
134 Id.
" Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-504, 92 Stat. 1705 substantially
altered the CAB's duties. The CAB now must issue a certificate if the airline shows
that adding the route is consistent with public convenience and necessity. 49 U.S.C. §
1371(d)(1)(A) (Supp. III 1979). An airline, therefore, could easily obtain certification
to fly to Rockford that would enable it to remove a flight from O'Hare. Under section
13710), an air carrier, provided it gives adequate notice, can abandon or nearly aban-
don operations between two points. 49 U.S.C. § 13710) (Supp. III 1979). Reducing
operations, therefore, would not require CAB approval.
"' Airport Noise Hearings, supra note 3, at 2,930 (May 23, 1978) (statement by E.
Studholme).
"8 Rule 505B(1)(k) of the AG Noise Proposal filed June 12, 1978, supra note 51.
13 Federal Aviation Act, 49 U.S.C. § 1348(a) (1976).
Id. at § 1303.
140 Rule 505B(3) of the AG Noise Proposal filed June 12, 1978, supra note 51 (set
forth in note 65).
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Several takeoff models were discussed in detail during the
IPCB hearings from the perspective of noise abatement and
safety. 141 The noise abatement takeoffs generally called for
thrust reduction after reaching a safe altitude, in an effort to
reduce engine noise. In order to safely reduce thrust, an air-
craft must first climb longer than usual at a comparatively
high and noisy takeoff thrust. For a conventional takeoff,
however, the average thrust during the climb over the area
within ten miles of the airport is greater than it would be dur-
ing a noise abatement takeoff.142 The effectiveness of the noise
abatement takeoff, therefore, depends upon the population
distribution in the areas surrounding the airport.
At the IPCB hearings, a quiet thrust takeoff favored by the
FAA was compared to the conventional takeoff suggested by
the Air Transport Association (ATA).14 ' The record reveals
that the quiet thrust takeoff of a 727, depending upon its
takeoff weight, emits 0.3 to 3.4 decibels more noise to the area
within 0 to 3.5 miles of the takeoff roll than does an ATA
takeoff.14 4 At the 4.5 mile mark, however, the quiet thrust pro-
cedure is 8.5 to 10.0 decibels quieter than the ATA proce-
dure. 1 45 From six to twelve miles from the takeoff roll, the
quiet thrust procedure is 5.6 to 7.6 decibels quieter than the
ATA procedure.'4
At O'Hare the largest noise contours 47 in descending order
are sixty-five, seventy-five, and eighty Ldn.' 48 The eighty Ldn
contour is within 3.5 miles of the airport.'4 9 Some of the sev-
"' The three basic takeoffs discussed were the Northwest takeoff, the ATA takeoff,
and the FAA quiet thrust takeoff. See Airport Noise Hearings, supra note 3, at 1,116-
23 (Nov. 29, 1977) (statements by J. Tyler); Id. at 3,495-3,509 (statement by H.
Benninghoff).
"' See Id. at 3,501.
143 Id. at 3,495-3,509.
144 Id. at 3,502.
145 Id. at 3,503-04.
141 Id. at 3,500.
147 A noise contour is an outline on a map plotting noise levels in an area surround-
ing a noise source. The contour is developed by connecting points which are exposed
to the same noise level.
148 Airport Noise Hearings, supra note 3, at 3,497 (July 28, 1978) (statement by H.
Benninghoff).
149 Id. at 3,428.
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enty-five Ldn contour is beyond 3.5 miles, but it is totally
within 4.5 miles of the airport.150 The sixty-five Ldn contour
primarily extends from 4.5 to 10.0 miles from the airport. 15
The issue presented to the FAA at O'Hare, therefore, is
whether it should institute a quiet thrust procedure for 727's
at O'Hare that would slightly increase noise levels in the areas
most impacted by airport noise, in order to achieve a reduc-
tion of a large magnitude over an area greater in size but
slightly less affected by noise. The ability of 737's and DC9's
to fly the quiet thrust takeoff at a safe altitude had yet to be
determined at the time of the IPCB hearings. 52 Implementa-
tion of the reduced thrust takeoff procedure, however, would
still be the best noise abatement method available to
O'Hare."5
e. Changes in Takeoff Flight Paths5 4
Any change in the flight paths at O'Hare would be subject
to approval by the FAA. 5 From a technical standpoint, there
are few, if any, practical changes in flight paths at O'Hare,
designed to avoid noise sensitive areas, that could measurably
reduce noise emissions. The hearings before the IPCB indi-
cated that many of the changes that the attorney general be-
lieved could be instituted at O'Hare already had been imple-
mented. 56 The proponent's own witness acknowledged that
making flight path changes solely on the basis of noise abate-
ment could seriously add to delays, and that flight path
changes are not a logical means to reducing noise emissions to
"o Id.
"' Id. at 3,497-98.
III Id. at 3507-08.
so "By comparing the various noise abatement strategies, the modified take-off
[sic] and night-time [sic] procedures at O'Hare are shown to be cost beneficial by a
wide margin. The modified take-off [sic] procedure would remove 54,000 housing
units from within the 65 Ld
_ 
contour, while housing units remaining within the con-
tour would enjoy a noise reduction." IINR, Opinion of ETAC, supra note 86, at v.
" Rule 505B(1)(m) of the AG Noise Proposal filed June 12, 1978, supra note 51.
Federal Aviation Act of 1958, 49 U.S.C. § 1348(a) (1976).
ISO Airport Noise Hearings, supra note 3, at 2,886-87 (May 23, 1978) (statement by
E. Studholme); Id. at 3,287-89 (July 28, 1978) (statements by H. Benninghof).
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the most seriously impacted areas.15 7
f. Landing Noise Abatement Procedures"58
The attorney general, in including landing noise abatement
procedures as a variance consideration, contemplated airlines
using a two segment approach. 59 This approach calls for an
initial descent slope of six degrees, with a change to a final
slope of three degrees, rather than a conventional one seg-
ment, three degree approach.6 0 There are two advantages of
the two-segment landing over the conventional approach: (1)
the thrust level is less because the initial six degree descent
increases speed through gravitational pull rather than engine
thrust; and (2) the airplane is higher in the air for a longer
period when over noise sensitive areas.
The benefits from noise reduction, however, appear to be
small, if the two-segment approach is to be flown safely. First,
not all airplanes can fly a six degree upper segment because of
weight, flap drag, and energy considerations;"' consequently,
the noise reduction benefits would be small if less than all the
airplanes followed the procedure. Second, most airplanes
would have to apply full flaps, thus increasing noise from aer-
odynamic drag, to keep the descent rate and engine speed
within the prescribed limits required to battle wind sheer, to
negotiate a sudden ascent in the case of runway blockage, and
to maintain engine spool speed needed for symetrical revers-
ing or braking.''2 Third, instrument landings at O'Hare re-
quire that the aircraft follow a straight, stable descent for the
last five or six miles to allow for a straight roll down, to assure
approach control, and to facilitate aircraft spacing in the
air. 168
The ATA, consequently, favors its own 1972 approach pro-
,17 Id. at 2,907 (May 23, 1978) (statement by E. Studholme).
'" Rule 505B(1)(1) of the AG Noise Proposal filed June 12, 1978, supra note 51.
"9 Airport Noise Hearings, supra note 3, at 545 (Nov. 27, 1977) (statements by J.
Tyler).
Ia d.
z Id. at 3,250 (Sept. 24 1978) (statement by H. Benninghoff).
162 Id. at 3,252.
"I3 Id. at 3,261.
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cedure which calls for the minimum flap configuration that
still preserves engine speed needed for maneuverablility. '"
Flaps are left at the aircraft's certified minimum setting and
are not changed after the plane descends to 500 feet.1"
O'Hare has followed this procedure since 1972 and it is un-
likely that any change will be forthcoming.
1 66
g. Changes in Approach Paths 167
The testimony at the IPCB hearings did not precisely re-
veal the effects of approach path turns designed to avoid noise
sensitive areas. General statements, however, indicate that
these turns would not reduce noise levels within five miles of
O'Hare. 1 18 The O'Hare instrument landing system (ILS)
tracks planes within five miles of the runway.169 This assures
that the plane will be stable and perfectly aligned with the
centerline of the runway. An incidental, but important, noise
benefit of an ILS landing is that thrust needed to accomplish
a turn is not reapplied close to the airport at a low altitude.
A heavy, wide-bodied plane cannot safely turn within three
miles of landing except under favorable weather conditions."'
The IPCB record, however, does not indicate that applying
thrust and completing a turn in an area three to five miles
from O'Hare would result in any noise reduction. It is conceiv-
able that the benefit to residents in the area from approxi-
mately 4.5 to 10.0 miles from the airport might exceed the
added noise detriment imposed on those residents within 4.5
miles of the airport if approach paths were changed.1 71 Conse-
quently, changing approach paths is a variance consideration
which has some merit.
'6 Id. at 3,253.
165 Id.
16 Id at 3,256.
107 Rule 505B(1)(n) of the AG Noise Proposal filed June 12, 1978, supra note 51.
10 Airport Noise Hearings, supra note 3, at 3,260 (Sept. 24, 1978) (statements by
H. Benninghoff).
16 Id. at 3,261.
370 Id. at 3,483-84.
7 See Id. at 3,495-3,509.
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3. Noise Abatement Actions That Are Controlled by
Local Zoning Authorities
The attorney general's proposal also requires that the peti-
tioner for a variance undertake the following three actions: (1)
present the IPCB with a cost-benefit analysis of potential
land use changes that could improve compliance with the
noise standard; 172 (2) demonstrate that a good faith effort has
been made to induce land use authorities to restrict non-Class
A land to land use designations other than Class A, if such
land presently receives, or will in the future receive, noise in
excess of the airport noise limitation; 173 and (3) demonstrate
that a good faith effort has been made to induce land use au-
thorities to rezone Class A land that receives noise emissions
in excess of the airport noise limitation.17 4 The most glaring
legal deficiency presented by this consideration is that "good
faith" is undefined. Failure by the IPCB to provide criteria
for good faith would jeopardize the affirmation of its variance
denials on appeal. This impediment is by no means fatal and
should be adequately resolved without excessive controversy.
From a practical standpoint, however, there are other
problems with the proposal's approach which are not easily
remedied. Both the probability that O'Hare could influence
land use changes and that it could take a significant step to-
ward compliance through its efforts are small. Testimony from
the IPCB hearings indicates that O'Hare, in the past, has
failed to cooperate with communities in their planning ef-
forts.17 '5 The foremost reason appears to be that O'Hare has
hesitated in revealing its master plan to surrounding commu-
nities because it wishes to maintain operational flexibility.17
By showing the master plan to communities, O'Hare would
be limiting its ability to make planning changes. If communi-
ties were zoned according to the master plan, O'Hare could
not depart from the plan without incurring either public scorn
12 Rule 501(B)(1) of the A. G. Noise Proposal, supra note 51.
I" ld. at Rule 501(B)(4).
174 Id. at Rules 505 B (3) and 505 B (4).
"" See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
176 Id. at 1,139-40 (November 29, 1977) (statement by J. Tyler).
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or liability. A resident might assert, in a nuisance or inverse
condemnation action, that O'Hare made representations
which it knew the zoning authority would reasonably rely
upon, that O'Hare received the benefit of being surrounded by
compatible land without incurring costs for easement acquis-
tion, and that by departing from the master plan, O'Hare (1)
unreasonably disturbed the urban plan, thereby creating a
nuisance and (2) took property without just compensation by
knowingly disturbing the residents' reasonable, investment-
backed expectations. Although these actions might not be suc-
cessful, O'Hare would still incur substantial legal fees. Accord-
ingly, O'Hare has rarely exhibited its master plan publicly.
The public pressure caused by the attorney general's propo-
sal has caused O'Hare to be less protective of its expansion
plans. Testimony by O'Hare area residents indicates that
O'Hare's formerly defensive posture has caused numerous
homeowners, who consciously attempted to locate away from
flight paths, or who were homeowners before O'Hare's expan-
sion, to suffer torment that they could not have reasonably
anticipated. 177 Zoning suggestions by O'Hare, therefore, are
bound to be looked upon with distrust.
On the other hand, there is a natural tendency for munici-
palities to ignore any proposal to restrict land near an airport
from Class A designation. O'Hare is located on low-lying, flat
ground. As a major airport, it is served by sewers, highways,
"" Airport Noise Hearings, supra note 3, at 166 (June 17, 1977) (statement by
Principal Rittmueller that his school, which was built in 1904, is significantly affected
by O'Hare noise); Id. at 212 (statement by E. Poulson that she moved because of
O'Hare noise after eighteen years in River Forest); Id. at 287 (July 8, 1977) (state-
ment by School Superintendent Coad of Bensenville that seven of its schools that
were built before or concurrently with O'Hare are seriously affected by noise); Id. at
307-10 (statement by the Director of Engineering of a home for the elderly, estab-
lished at its location in 1893, that the O'Hare noise nearly jeopardized HUD financing
for expansion); Id. at 325-26 (statement by homeowner that her house is now under a
flight path but it wasn't when she bought the home eight years ago); Id. at 334-36
(statement by Leyden Township School Superintendent Byrne that a school built in
1960, when O'Hare air traffic was light, is now severely affected and that other
schools had to be soundproofed at great expense); Id. at 348 (statement by resident of
thirty years that she only began experiencing annoyance when a new runway was
opened); Id. at 353 (statement by homeowner that a runway that opened a year and
one half after she moved in turned the neighborhood from peaceful to noise-plagued).
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and utilities. These conditions are ideally suited for residen-
tial development and motivate developers to lobby for land
use designations that are most profitable to them.'78 Zoning
authorities, furthermore, recognize the potential for increased
property tax revenue that would result from a Class A desig-
nation. The demand for new residences in areas served by the
transportation corridor that extends from the Chicago Loop to
O'Hare helps reduce noise to an unimportant issue during the
development stage.' 79 Noise impact does not achieve signifi-
cance until the residents' expectations become frustrated.
Several factors, therefore, oppose O'Hare's success in influenc-
ing authorities to restrict land use to non-Class A use. The
municipalities participating in the IPCB hearings, however,
indicated that they desired meaningful relief and would listen
to O'Hare if the airport were willing to commit itself to a
plan. Land use control, however, may affect as little as seven
percent of the land that encroaches upon O'Hare. 180 Coopera-
tion, nevertheless, would help prevent the noise problem from
intensifying.
The likelihood that O'Hare can induce downzoning of Class
A land, however, is quite remote. A municipality that at-
tempts to enforce downzoning subjects itself to actions for in-
verse condemnation if it does not compensate individuals
holding construction permits for the land affected. 181 The im-
mediate loss of tax revenue that often results from downzon-
ing, also increases the likelihood that O'Hare will not be able
to influence zoning authorities to reclassify Class A land.
h. Exemptions
The proposal exempts a proprietor from being found in vio-
"' See Airpoit Noise Hearings, supra note 3, at 2094 (March 9, 1978) (statement
by D. Schein, a research geographer, that subdivision development around O'Hare is
due to economic opportunities created by the commercial access that developed with
the airport's growth).
'9 Id. at 2,084-87.
18o See NORTHEASTERN ILLINOIS PLANNING COMMISSION, METROPOLITAN NOISE
ABATEMENT POLICY STUDY, O'HARE INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT 21 (Report No. HUD/
DOT INAP - 71-1, July, 1971) [1975 forecast].
"I See Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980).
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lation of the airport noise rules for land which meets all three
of the following requirements: (1) land that was designated
Class A at the time an airport noise abatement plan was (a)
filed with the IPCB as a variance requirement or (b)
presented to the authority with zoning jurisdiction over the
land;182 (2) land that was described in the noise abatement
plan as receiving noise in excess of the prescribed limits; 88
and (3) land that was included in the efforts of the airport
authorities to prevent a change to Class A use. 184 This exemp-
tion protects the proprietor who has a publicly available noise
abatement plan from liability for land which, despite the pro-
prietor's efforts, is designated Class A, provided that the pro-
prietor properly identified the land as receiving noise in ex-
cess of the Class A standard. This safeguards the proprietor's
variance by relieving him from liability for the informed, but
poor, judgment of local zoning authorities. It induces the pro-
prietor to make full disclosure to obtain limited immunity
from liability. This provision provides significant peace of
mind for O'Hare because being able to influence all the nu-
merous suburban communities surrounding the airport would
be an impossible task. Under the proposed exemption,
O'Hare, once it has fully disclosed its abatement plan, need
not worry about incurring unexpected legal fees or penalties
caused by a zoning authority's actions.
The proposal also includes a provision that exempts the
proprietor from noise regulation liability if a navigational
easement or an equivalent interest in the land has been pur-
chased.8 5 The purchase of easements would be a cost effective
compliance, not noise abatement option, only if O'Hare had a
few remaining Class A parcels that still received noise in ex-
cess of the standard. The exemption serves as an expeditious
escape from the costs of the variance procedure or from a pen-
alty stemming from enforcement. The exemption probably
was designed to allow small Illinois airports to avoid the costs
1'" Rule 506A(1) of the AG Noise Proposal filed June 12, 1978, supra note 51.
163 Id. at Rule 506A(2).
184 Id. at Rule 506A(3).
188 Id at Rule 506B.
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of preparing noise contours, zoning maps, and population in-
formation required in a variance petition.
VI. CONCLUSION
The noise problem at O'Hare will be solved when airlines
operate a fleet composed of the newest generation of air-
planes. Until the airlines achieve this time-consuming and ex-
traordinarily expensive goal, 8" attempts will be made to as-
sure short-term relief. The proposal by the Illinois Attorney
General to regulate noise from Illinois airports, submitted to
the IPCB, is an ambitious attempt to coerce O'Hare and other
Illinois airports to initiate noise abatement measures in the
period prior to the full implementation of federal noise abate-
ment regulations. Adoption of the proposal, however, would
only provide symbolic relief to O'Hare residents who are har-
rassed by the noise emanating from the world's busiest
airport.
Even if the IPCB uses its power to revise the proposal,
practically, it would provide only marginal, contingent noise
relief and would subject the IPCB to litigation that might stay
the enforcement of the regulation. The establishment of a rea-
sonable airport noise standard and a mechanism that pro-
motes cooperation between O'Hare and its surrounding com-
munites, however, might overshadow the small numerical
drop in decibel levels. Residents could be given a noise limita-
tion that they could use in civil actions against the airport and
could also obtain information for wisely planning their resi-
dential environment. These considerations are beyond the
scope of the IPCB's duties. The General Assembly, however,
might consider requiring the IPCB to determine such a
standard.'8 7 .
Finally, the fate of the airport noise proposal is dictated by
its cost-benefit analysis. The expenses, incurred by the air-
port, the airlines, and the citizens of Illinois, do not appear to
'" See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
117 See Illinois Public Airports Association, Proposed Legislation Bill - Airport
Land Use - Zoning for "Noise Zone": Special Memorandum. (February 26, 1980).
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be justifiable when compared to the minimal quantified bene-
fits of a noise abatement policy structured around the attor-
ney general's proposal.1 88
' See supra note 86.
